ABSTRACT: After the catastrophic flooding of New Orleans due to hurricane Katrina in the year 2005, the city's hurricane protection system has been improved to provide protection against storms with at least a 100 year return period. The aim of this article is to investigate the risk to life in the post-Katrina situation for the New Orleans metro bowl. In a risk-based approach the probabilities and consequences of various flood scenarios have been analyzed to estimate the risk to life. A two-dimensional hydrodynamic model has been used to simulate flood characteristics. Results indicate that -depending on the flood scenario -the estimated loss of life in case of flooding ranges from about 100 to nearly 500. The highest life loss value is found for breaching of the river levees. Probability and consequence estimates are combined to evaluate the individual risk and societal risk for New Orleans. When compared to risks of other large scale engineering systems (e.g. other flood prone areas, dams and the nuclear sector) and acceptable risk criteria found in literature, the evaluated risk exceeds acceptable risk levels. Thus despite major improvements to the flood protection system, the flood risk of post-Katrina New Orleans is expected to be significant. Effects of risk reduction strategies on the risk level are investigated to assist in providing bases for decision making. Results indicate the necessity of further discussion regarding the management and reduction of the city's risk to flooding.
INTRODUCTION

Background and scope
Hurricane Katrina struck the southern coast of the United States on August 29, 2005. The surge caused by the storm overwhelmed the flood protection of New Orleans, Louisiana, leading to one of the worst natural disasters in American history. Catastrophic flooding throughout the city led to economic losses of more than 20 billion dollars, and approximately 1100 people lost their lives due to the flooding in Louisiana; 80% occurred in the flooded area (Jonkman et al, 2009) . Following the event, the US government committed and provided the people of New Orleans with 100 year level of flood protection. However, an important discussion remains regarding the residual risk associated with the upgraded protection system. The city's risk of flooding is expected to increase in the future due to several factors, primarily due to economic and population growth as the city continues to rebuild. While the updated 1/100 per year protection level is defined by national flood insurance policy precedents, considering the risk specific to the city of New Orleans allows acceptable and optimized protection levels to be discussed. Risk based principals are applied in other engineering fields, such as nuclear and chemical engineering, and the same approaches can be applied in the context of flood protection (Vrijling, 2001) . Risk is generally considered to be a function of the consequences and probability of an event. Therefore the analysis of risk allows potential consequences of a flood event to be considered in decision making. Also, effects of potential risk reducing measures can be systematically analyzed, an important aspect of managing and mitigating overall risk. Thus while decision making regarding flood risk management is complex and includes social, political and economic factors, evaluating the risk provides valuable technical information to be used in decision making for flood protection.
The objective of this article is to quantify the risk to life associated with the upgraded protection system of New Orleans. When evaluating risk, various dimensions of risk account for various consequences of an adverse event, such as economic loss, life loss, and environmental loss. Considering the catastrophic loss of life due to flooding as evidenced by Hurricane Katrina and flood events in other parts of the world, the risk to life is an important consideration in determining flood protection levels. The results of this study are compared to acceptable risk to life criterion found in literature and applied in other engineering sectors, providing insight into the level of risk of the city.
This article is outlined as follows: A brief overview of the applied approach is described in section 2. This section also describes the main assumptions and methods used in the risks analysis.. Section 3 describes the quantification of the risk to life in New Orleans. Section 4 presents an evaluation through the comparison to criterion in literature and other industries. Finally, risk reduction is discussed in section 5 where measures to mitigate risk are briefly analyzed. Concluding remarks are given in section 6.
Risk-based approach
A general risk assessment is carried out to achieve the objectives of this research. A risk assessment is generally thought to consist of the identification, quantification and evaluation of risk. A general approach to risk management (CUR, 1997) is followed in this thesis. The quantitative risk estimate is accomplished through the development of possible flood scenarios, similar to the approach applied in the FLORIS project (Flood Risk In the Netherlands) (Riedstra, 2010) . The simulated events give insight into the hydraulic characteristic of flooding and provide information about the potential impacts of flooding. A complete risk estimate would be based on a fully probabilistic analysis, considering all possible load and resistance parameters of the system. However, for the scope of this thesis, a limited number of scenarios are selected based on the way the city can be flooded. Scenarios with the greatest contribution to the overall flood probability are chosen. Failure probability estimates are based on the design criteria. A deterministic damage estimate is calculated for each scenario based on the characteristics of flooding. Figure 1 Steps of a Risk Assessment (Jonkman, 2007) The combination of the consequences of the simulated events with an estimated event probability of the events determines the risk. The quantified risk estimate is then evaluated by comparing it to limits of 'tolerable' or acceptable risk criterion. Proposed limits found in literature and industry are discussed for both flood events and other hazards. Such comparisons provide insight into the order of magnitude for an acceptable risk and a basis from which risk reduction alternatives can be evaluated. Decisions to reduce the risk are supplemented with information regarding the cost effectiveness of reduction measures. Ultimately, the risk assessment allows decisions to be made regarding the acceptability of the risk.
SYSTEM DEFINITION
Threat of flooding to New Orleans
The unique natural environment surrounding New Orleans makes the city highly vulnerable to flooding. Located in the deltaic plain of the Mississippi river as it discharges into the Gulf of Mexico, the city is bordered by Lake Pontchartrain to the north and Lake Borgne to the east. Coastal wetlands surrounding the city serve as a buffer to the sea. In addition to being largely surrounded by water, it is estimated over half of this metropolitan area is located below sea level, in some areas up to 9.4 feet (3 m) below mean sea level. In this study two types of events that can lead to breaching of the flood defenses are considered, namely storm surge and river flooding Flooding due to storm surge has impacted New Orleans repeatedly in the past. In 1965, Hurricane Betsy flooded 164,000 New Orleans homes and took 58 lives in the Orleans parish alone (Boyd 2011) . While hurricane Betsy initiated construction of the city's hurricane protection system, it was unable to withstand the unprecedented surge produced by Hurricane Katrina. 
Risk assessment
The second mechanism that can cause flooding to the city is due to a high river event. The Mississippi river delta drains 40% of the United States. Federally mandated flood protection has protected the city since 1927, when massive river flooding inundated much of the alluvial valley including areas of New Orleans. This river protection has been tested most recently in 2011, when record high stages initated the use of emergency levees and bypass structures to divert flow and control water levels in the lower delta.
Study Area and system boundaries
This assessment considers only a portion of the city of New Orleans, that with the highest population and economic value. This area, referred to as the 'metro bowl', is an area of roughly 100 km 2 (40 square miles) and home to a post Katrina population of roughly 220,000 persons (2011) To the north of the considered area lies Lake Ponchartrain, connected to the sea to the east, and therefore subject to the effects of storm surge. During Katrina, lake storm surge entered the city via drainage canals, causing disastrous flooding. These canals are now closed off where they meet the lake, preventing surge from entering the canals and effectively 'shortening' the coastline. To the east, lies the IHNC, the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal which connects to the Gulf Figure 3 System boundaries for the New Orleans metro bowl of Mexico. The IHNC is highly vulnerable to the effects of storm surge due to the confluence of two man made waterways at the east end of the canal. The waterways connect to the sea. During Katrina, surge levels in the canal reached 14ft (4.25m). Upgraded protection includes two new barriers that significantly reduce the opportunity for surge to enter the IHNC. Finally, the Mississippi river flows to the south of the considered area. The water level at this area of the river is affected by both high discharge and storm surge. While there has been no history of flooding to the city due to storm surge at the river boundary, water levels at the city are becoming increasingly influenced by the sea due to continued coastal land loss and ground subsidence and sea level rise. The river protection at the city is therefore designed to protect from both hydraulic mechanisms. The western boundary of the considered area is the parish or county line, and is chosen for simplification.
Quantitative flood risk analysis
In this section we first describe the approach and main assumptions for assessing the system reliability, flood effects and consequences. Results are then presented.
Reliability
To determine the reliability of the considered system, ideally a complete probabilistic analysis is required and would account for the possible strength parameters of the defence and the possible loads which act on the system such as wave and water level. When quantifying the strength variable, the analysis would consider failure of the defence due to various failure mechanisms such as overtopping and piping. Such types of analyses have been made for the New Orleans (IPET, 2008) and Dutch levee systems.
For simplification in this work, failure probabilities are based upon the protection design guidelines in combination with expert judgment. The hydraulic design guidelines determine the overtopping rate of the protection due to a 1/100 per year flood event and a design height is iterated to meet specified overtopping criteria. Robust design specifications, e.g. for armouring and seepage protection, have been applied in order to achieve that the probability of failure due to other (geotechnical) failure mechanisms is substantially smaller. Thus although multiple failure modes can cause a defense to fail, the failure probability estimates are based on overtopping.
To estimate the system failure probability, the system is divided into elements of similar strength and load characteristics where the failure of any element leads to flooding of the protected area). The system is assumed to act as a serial system and the overall failure probability assumed to be approximately the sum of the element probabilities (assumed independent failures). Correlations or dependencies in failure probabilities between different sections, and the exact contribution of various failure mechanisms would be taken into account in a more detailed analysis.
Drainage canals
Development of Flood scenarios
Flooding due to failure of hurricane protection and river levees is simulated. Scenarios are chosen to model the various potential load conditions and the behaviour of the various protection elements. Also they are chosen to result in a distribution of consequences. The 1D-2D SOBEK overland flow model used is developed by Deltares and is based on a previously developed model of the New Orleans metro area (see de Bruijn, 2006) . Breaches along the lake, canal and river breaches are modeled. For each simulation, a deterministic breach location, hydraulic load and breach growth rate have been assumed. The hydraulic boundary condition of each scenario models that of an event with a return period at which failure is assumed to occur, e.g. the 1000 year water levels along the river (see results). Breach growth rates are based on Katrina breach evidence. The result of the simulation is progression of flood waters and depth is simulated as the model computed depth and velocity as a function of time.
Consequence Determination
A life loss model relates characteristics of flooding to mortality rate, or the number of persons killed by flooding divided by the number of people present during the event (the exposed population). Fatality functions are derived based on the observations of Katrina (Jonkman 2007 , Maaskant 2007 Jonkman et al., 2009) . For the metro bowl, two zones of flood characteristics have been distinguished corresponding to two mortality functions (see fig. 5 ). (Maaskant, 2007) .
A spatially varying mortality rate for each scenario is determined. as a result The mortality rate is a characteristic of a location, and therefore two further assumptions must be made to determine fatalities: the distribution and number of population exposed to the flooding. 2010 US census data provides the distribution of initial population in the form of population per census tract. The initial population is combined with an assumed evacuation rate to determine the exposed population. During hurricane Katrina, the estimated evacuation rate was about 80% (Jonkman et al., 2009; Wolshon, 2006 ). An evacuation rate of 90% is applied as it is considered evacuation has improved since hurricane Katrina. Table 1 presents the results for the various scenarios that have been analyzed. The second column shows the failure probability estimate of the scenario (see above). The calculated mortality rate is associated with the spatial distribution of population to determine an expected fatality value for each scenario. Results range from 0.4% for the breach at the IHNC, to 2.0% for the scenario of a breach due to a high river event. When the mortality is combined with an estimate of the 'exposed population', a loss of life result High river breach, maximum depth (m) Lake breach, maximum depth (m) is calculated, ranging from 100 to 450. Flooding due to the river event is especially devastating, as the duration of the flood wave can be up to several weeks, (compared to a hurricane event the water rises and falls more rapidly), and the metro bowl will continue to fill with water until the breach is closed. This will result in flood depths of over 5m in many parts of the Metro bowl. Given the dependence on assumptions and uncertainties in the various models, the results give an indication of the order of magnitude of consequences of the various breaches.
Results
Other uncertainties in consequence estimates are associated with the selection and modeling of flood scenarios. The sensitivity of the mortality results is investigated for various selected scenario parameters. In general the mortality rate is not very sensitive to breach parameters, as the final flood depths would eventually match the boundary water level in each scenario (de Bruijn, 2006) . Hydrograph duration however, was seen to significantly increase mortality, as maximum water depths were increased. This boundary condition could be analyzed further in an effort to provide a more accurate estimate. Overall however, flood extents, characteristics and resulting mortality rates are seen to be comparable to those that occurred as a result of Hurricane Katrina. Thus while significant improvements have been made to the protection system, all scenarios result in catastrophic flooding of the metro bowl.
RISK QUANTIFICATION
Combining the probability of each event and the resulting consequences for the event, results in an estimation of risk to life. The result is quantified as individual risk and societal risk, metrics used to depict and limit the risk.
Individual Risk
The probability of an individual residing in a given area perishing as a consequence of flooding, Individual risk, can be determined by the following formula:
Where IR(x,y)= the individual risk at location (x,y) [yr -1 ]; Pi = the probability of occurrence of flood scenario i [yr -1 ]; F D|i (x,y) = the mortality at location (x,y) given flood scenario i [-] ; Fe = evacuated fraction of the initial population.
The individual risk is a characteristic of a location, and defines the risk level spatially for a permanently present individual. To include evacuation considerations, the IR is multiplied by the exposed percentage of the population. Figure 5 shows the results of individual risk for the metro bowl. The bowl largely has an IR value of greater than 10 -5 per year with a maximum value of 5 x 10 -5 per year. As the IR is a function of the depth dependent mortality function, it largely corresponds with the area topography. 1.3% Figure 6 Map of individual risk assuming 90% evacuation
Societal Risk
Societal Risk is considered to be the probability of exceedance (in a year) of a certain number of fatalities due to one event in a given population (Jonkman, 2007) . The societal risk is a function of the population directly exposed to the flooding, thus evacuation and shelter are considered. An FN curve, a frequency -number curve, is commonly used to depict societal risk. The curve's intersection with the y-axis is the cumulative probability of the scenarios in table 1. The studied area's overall flooding probability: 1.12 × 10 -2 yr −1 . The intersection with the xaxis is the consequence result of the scenario with the largest consequences, roughly 450 fatalities. The FN curve of this study is plotted against an FN curve based on data from the IPET risk study (IPET, 2009) . Loss of life estimates resulting from the IPET study were used for the New Orleans metro bowl for floods with a 100 and 500 year return period and predicted 2011 population levels. As a conservative assumption, the IPET case with no pumping was plotted (as the cases with 50% and 100% pumping capacity would give lower consequence and risk estimates). Variations in approach exist between the two studies, including the use of post-Katrina population data in the IPET approach. However, the comparison shows that both FN curves are similar. Also included in the figure is an indicative plot of the Katrina event, demonstrating the risk reduction effects of the upgraded system. It is noted that not all Katrina related fatalities occurred in New Orleans or in the flood zone. If the risks for the current situation are assessed taking into account other areas (parts of New Orleans and Louisiana) the loss of life and risk estimates for the current situation will be higher.
Probability and fatality estimates for the scenarios are combined to determine the expected number of fatalities, about 2 fatalities/year. 
EVALUATION OF FLOOD RISK WITH EXISTING RISK LIMITS
The results are indicative but realistic first estimates of risk level. To evaluate the risk, results are first compared with acceptable risk criterion found in literature. Two sources of criteria include a framework developed by Vrijling (1995) , and criteria proposed by recently updated Dam and Levee safety guidelines of the US Army corps of Engineers (USACE, 2010).
Individual Risk Criterion
For individual risk criterion, both investigated criteria are based on the analysis of fatality statistics. First the approach of Vrijling proposes that individual risk should add less than 1% to the existing probability of death (10 -4 per year). The following equation is proposed to describe an appropriate individual risk level:
In this expression, the policy factor β represents the level of voluntariness of the activity, with a higher level of voluntariness corresponding to a higher β value. In investigation of the fatality rate of various activities, voluntary activities correlate to a higher risk level than that of involuntary. The context of flood protection in urban areas is considered a relatively involuntary situation (although this is a topic for discussion). A β value of 0.1 represents this level of voluntariness, resulting in an IR limit of 10 -5 per year. This framework is applied in other fields, for example in industrial safety, where a risk limit of 10 -6 per year is determined to be appropriate (Vrijling, 2011) . USACE guidelines define tolerable risk as the risk that society is willing to live with so as to secure certain benefits. Considering existing limits currently used in industry (dam design, chemical contamination and land use planning), a 'tolerable risk' limit of 10 -4 per year was found to have achieved consensus among government and private sectors institutions engaged in safety management. While this criterion is more risk seeking than that proposed by Vrijling, an intermediate 'ALARP' (As Low As Reasonably Practical) zone is included in the guidelines. This zone characterizes a 'tolerable' and 'acceptable' risk level between 10 -6 per year and 10 -4 per year and provides for the many complex factors involved in determining acceptable risk such as cost effectiveness and societal concern. When assessing the individual risk for New Orleans, the risk is relatively low in comparison with the probability of an auto accident for example (10 -4 per year), and falling within the ALARP zone of the USACE (between tolerable and acceptable risk). However, the majority of the metro bowl results in IR values higher than 10 -5 per year, exceeding the acceptable level of individual risk proposed by Vrijling.
Societal risk Criterion
Criterion for societal risk is generally more conservative than for individual risk. Society as a whole is more averse to large, multi-fatality event and such events provoke a greater social political response (Baecher, 2009) . To determine if societal risk is acceptable, the FN curve representing the societal risk is plotted against an acceptable 'limit line. Again based on accident statistics, the threshold for a national, socially acceptable level is proposed by Vrijling:
where F(n) = cumulative distribution function of the number of fatalities, C N = a constant that determines the vertical position of the limit line [yr − 1 fat − α ]. And α = risk aversion coefficient that determines the slope of the limit line. C N is determined by ( β *100/k) 2 , again including the policy factor β and a coefficient k generally set to 3 (Vrijling, 1997) . The resulting C N represents the relative size of the impacted area/population at a national scale for the Netherlands. To apply the limit to a specific system, the limit scale must be adapted for the relative magnitude of the installation assessed. This concept however is not examined well in this paper, and is not elaborated on further. The USACE guidelines provide criteria for societal risk again based upon existing acceptable risk limits applied in other sectors including the US Bureau of Reclamation in their development of their dam safety program (USBRC, 2003) . The USACE applies a base point of the annual probability of 0.001 per year corresponding to the loss of one life, in combination with a limit line slope of 1 for acceptable risk associated with flood protection. Considerations for an intermediate realm beween tolerable and acceptable Figure 9 New Orleans Societal risk compared to limits proposed in literature risk, the ALARP zone, are included. The varying risk aversion coefficient α (slope of the limit line of 1 or 2) applied in the two approaches reflects a difference in reflects risk aversion toward large multiple fatality accidents. Discussion regarding this coefficient is ongoing, as an appropriate level of risk aversion varies amongst approaches. When results of this study are plotted against proposed limit lines, it is seen that the societal risk for New Orleans exceeds criterion limits, most notably so when compared against criterion found in the updated USACE tolerable risk guidelines. Comparison can also be made with societal risk of other sectors, such as is seen figure 9. Here, failure probability and fatality data of several industries is plotted (Lambert and Associates, 1982) . By doing so, insight into the relative magnitude of the risks in different domains and magnitude of risk to life of the city of New Orleans can be gathered. 
EFFECTIVENESS OF MEASURES TO REDUCE RISK
As the risk of flooding exceeds discussed acceptable risk criterion, the effects of various risk reduction strategies can be determined. The quantitative risk estimate allows the reductive effects to be analyzed in a systematic and consistent way. Reduction measures can be categorized into measures that reduce event probability and measures that reduce event consequences. Measures to reduce the probability of While the risk reducing effect of load reducing measures, such as barrier islands, wetland restoration and river diversions, is difficult to quantify and outside this research scope, it is expected that such measures play an important role in the future of flood protection for New Orleans. These measures could reduce the (return periods) hydraulic loads on the system and thus improve the level of protection flooding include increased protection as well measures that reduce the load on the system. . The effect of increased protection however can be determined through the use of the quantified risk metrics, FN curve and risk maps, and protection levels that meet the various risk criterion are in The effects of measures to reduce the consequences are also determined. The strategies for which risk reduction effects have been discussed include: elevated homes, improved evacuation and relocation of population to higher areas. When the reductive effect of each measure is combined with a cost estimate for each proposed measures, the cost effectiveness of reduction measures can be assessed. The CSX value, or the cost of saving an extra statistical life, is expressed to describe this cost effectiveness:
Where: CSX = the cost of saving an extra statistical life per year ($/Fat/Yr), I = investment ($), and E(N)= expected number of fatalities (fat/yr).
The lower the ratio between the investment and the saved lives, the more cost effective the measure is. Results of the analysis show that increasing evacuation is the most cost effective as it limits the exposed population at a relatively low cost. It is noted that this evaluation focuses on reduction of risk to life. Improving evacuation would hardly reduce the economic damage that would result from widespread flooding. Comparing remaining alternatives, the 1/500 year protection level is most cost effective. The elevation of homes is second most cost effective as it reduces the depth of flooding having a significant reduction on the mortality rate. The reductive effect of the relocation of population within the Metro bowl is minimal due to the large flood extents of the scenarios modeled. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
An evaluation of the risk to life for the city of New Orleans has been carried out. Evaluation of results show that the risk, while reduced from the preKatrina status, is still significant. The quantified individual risk to life exceeds some proposed risk to life criterion and falls within the tolerable and acceptable criteria of the USACE. The resulting societal risk also exceeds criteria proposed in literature and is high compared to societal risk found in other sectors. Thus while there is not a consensus on an acceptable risk to life criteria, the risk to life for New Orleans, both individual and societal, is outside some of the risk limits proposed in literature. Investigation into the quantified effects of risk reduction strategies show that evacuation is the most cost effective and should thus continue to be encouraged. An increase in protection level is the next most cost effective, promoting discussion for further increase in protection levels.
The results presented have been based on only a limited number of flood scenarios. For a more complete evaluation, it is recommended to include a more complete set of scenarios to better represent possible load situations, breach combinations and flood conditions. As the approach has considered solely a portion of the city, application to the remaining metropolitan areas of New Orleans provides a better overall picture of the risk. A complete reliability analysis should be carried out to verify event probabilities estimated in this research. Reduction measures should be analyzed in greater detail and include measures to reduce the load, such as wetland restoration and barrier islands, and a multiple lines of defense approach, combining coastal habitat restoration and engineered flood protection (Lopez, 2007) . Economic risk considerations should be included to provide a more complete picture of the risk of the city. Based on the results of this study and anticipating increased flood risk in the future, further discussion is recommended regarding the acceptable level of flood risk for the city is necessary. 
